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a b s t r a c t
End-to-end data aggregation, without degrading sensing accuracy, is a very relevant issue in wireless
sensor networks (WSN) that can prevent network congestion to occur. Moreover, privacy management
requires that anonymity and data integrity are preserved in such networks. Unfortunately, no integrated
solutions have been proposed so far, able to tackle both issues in a uniﬁed and general environment. To
bridge this gap, in this paper we present an approach for dynamic secure end-to-end data aggregation
with privacy function, named DyDAP. It has been designed starting from a UML model that encompasses
themost important building blocks of a privacy-awareWSN, including aggregation policies. Furthermore,
it introduces an original aggregation algorithm that, using a discrete-time control loop, is able to dynami-
cally handle in-network data fusion to reduce the communication load. The performance of the proposed
scheme has been veriﬁed using computer simulations, showing that DyDAP avoids network congestion
and therefore improves WSN estimation accuracy while, at the same time, guaranteeing anonymity and
data integrity.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) technologies support data col-
lection and distributed data processing by means of very small
sensing devices (Akyildiz et al., 2007) with limited computation
and energy capabilities. WSN are used in many contexts such
as telemedicine, surveillance systems, assistance to disabled and
elderly people, environmental monitoring, localization of services
andusers, industrial process control, and systems supporting trafﬁc
monitoring/control in urban/suburban areas, military and/or anti-
terrorism operations.
Data transmission is one of the most power demanding tasks in
WSN and therefore messages forwarding policies and processing
techniques should be carefully designed to extend network life-
time. For example, a very common technique consists in keeping
WSN nodes silent as long as no relevant information is detected in
the monitored area (Dardari et al., 2007). Then, when some infor-
mation is detected, wireless interfaces are turned on and sensors
transmit the sensed data. However, the main drawback of such
an approach is that it can cause network congestion (Akan and
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Akyildiz, 2005) and as a consequence some information may get
lost.
To avoid network congestion one solution consists in using
proper in-network algorithms (e.g., see Bagaa et al., 2007;
Mahimkar and Rappaport, 2004; Castelluccia et al., 2005; Hu and
Evans, 2003) that can reduce signiﬁcantly the number of bytes
exchanged across theWSNby aggregating data (Younis et al., 2006;
Fasoloet al., 2007;Mastrocristinoet al., 2010). In fact, inmanysitua-
tions, what is needed are aggregatedmeasures, such as the average
temperature of a region and the average humidity.
Another important issue in WSN is represented by privacy that
may be violated by tampering of sensors and/or trafﬁc due to
the nature of the wireless channel and its deployment in uncon-
trolled environments. Thus, privacy aware mechanisms are crucial
for severalWSN applications such as localization and telemedicine.
Among the different aspects characterizing privacy, anonymity is
an important requirement for a privacy aware system that aims at
protecting the identity of the individuals whose data are handled
by the system. Moreover, it may be necessary to take into account
privacy also in some application contexts in which data referring
to individuals are not directly handled by WSN. For example, in
home networks, sensor nodes may collect a large amount of data
that may reveal habits of individuals, violating in this way their
privacy.
However, the low power resources and the limited compu-
tational and storage capabilities of sensor nodes impose severe
constraints on how privacy requirements can be satisﬁed.
0164-1212/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jss.2011.07.043
Author's personal copy
S. Sicari et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 85 (2012) 152–166 153
Considering together data aggregation and privacy issues is
a very challenging problem, falling in the main research area of
secure WSN (Grieco et al., 2009). Many solutions addressing at the
same time aggregation and security aspects such as conﬁdentiality,
integrity, authentication, and availability can be found in literature
(for an exhaustive and very comprehensive view of this topic see
Ozdemir and Xiao, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge,
no solution is able to encompass privacy and end-to-end secure
data aggregation.
This paper presents an approach that couples a privacy man-
agement policy with an original aggregation algorithm able to
deal with end-to-end encrypted data. The approach, namedDyDAP
(Dynamic Data Aggregation with Privacy functions), is based on
the privacymodel proposed in previousworks (Coen-Porisini et al.,
2007, 2010a,b). Such amodel, deﬁned in UML (OMG, 2007a,b), rep-
resents a general schema that can be easily adopted in different
contexts. DyDAP adapts such a schema to the context of WSN by
introducing concepts, such as nodes, data, actions that are needed
to deﬁne a privacy policy along with the existing relationships
among them. Moreover, DyDAP integrates an original aggregation
algorithm designed by exploiting linear discrete time control the-
ory (Mastrocristino et al., 2010; Astrom and Wittenmark, 1995).
Using DyDAP, each node periodically evaluates the amount of data
to aggregate in order to control the level of its transmission queue.
The aggregation process, which merges spatial correlated data
working on encrypted information, involves only linear operations
and allows the sink node to estimate the conﬁdence level of the
aggregated data.
Themain goals fulﬁlledbyour approach are: (i) anonymityman-
agement; (ii) data integrity check; (iii) data aggregation to reduce
the network load; (iv) end-to-end secure data aggregation. The
effectivenessof theapproachhasbeen studiedusing computer sim-
ulations. Notice that simulations are used to evaluate aspects such
as congestion, data loss, numberof transmittedmessages, accuracy,
while they are not useful to show that security/privacy goals are
satisﬁed. In fact for these latter aspects we rely on the fact that the
techniques used (such as encryption) guarantee “by construction”
that such goals are met. In conclusion we show that DyDAP avoids
network congestionand improvesWSNestimationaccuracy,while,
at the same time, guaranteeing anonymity management and data
integrity.
The rest of thepaper is organizedas follows. Section2 introduces
the foundations formodelingprivacy in the context ofWSN. Section
3 describes the reference scenario and the foundations on which
DyDAP is based. Section 4 presents DyDAP in detail, while Section
5 reports the simulation results that show the effectiveness of
DyDAP. Section 6 presents themost relevant relatedworks. Finally,
Section 7 draws some conclusions and provides hints for future
works.
2. Modeling privacy policies for wireless sensor networks
A privacy policy deﬁnes the way in which data referring to indi-
viduals can be collected, processed, and diffused according to the
rights that individuals are entitled to.
The rest of the paper adopts the terminology introduced by the
EU directive (Directive, 1995). Notice that the terminology is as
much technology-independent as possible and therefore, beside
the original deﬁnition, we provide the needed reﬁnements in order
to support the deﬁnition of privacy mechanisms in WSN commu-
nications:
• Personal data means any information related to an identiﬁed or
identiﬁable natural person (referred to as data subject or sub-
ject). In the context of WSN, they represent the data sensed by
the nodes of the network; in other words, nodes play the role of
subjects since they receive information from the environment in
which they are located.
• Processing of personal data (processing) means any operation
or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, record-
ing, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwisemaking available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction. In the context of WSN, activities such as
sensing data, receiving/transmitting messages, aggregating data,
encrypting/decrypting data and verifying data integrity can be
considered as processing.
• Controller means the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes andmeans of the processing of personal
data. In a WSN, nodes play the role of controllers of the network,
since they verify the processing actions that involve sensed data.
• Processormeansanatural or legalperson,public authority, agency
or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of the
controller. In a WSN, the role of processor is played by the nodes
of the network.
• Data subject consent (consent)means any freely given speciﬁc and
informed indication of his/her wishes by which the data subject
signiﬁes his/her agreement to personal data relating to him/her
being processed.
As a distinctive feature of a privacy policy, the processor is
required to state for what purpose data are processed. A purpose
can be deﬁned either as a high-level activity (e.g., “monitoring”,
“tracking”) or as a set of actions (e.g., “determine the average tem-
perature”, “evaluate the humidity”).
In addition processing actions may be executed under speciﬁc
obligations. Anobligation is a set of actions that theprocessor and/or
the controller guarantees to carry out at the end of the processing
activities. For example, a node that measures the temperature of
the ground may be required to send an alert message whenever
the temperature is less than a given threshold.
In a privacy aware system, subjects have to grant their consent
before any processing can occur on their data. In the context of
WSN we assume that the consent is implicitly given by the nodes
of the network. This means that every node accepts that its data
may undergo different processing activities each of which consist-
ing in a set of processing actions (andobligations) thatmayoccur on
the other nodes of the network. Notice that the above assumption
requires that the system modeler adopts adequate mechanisms to
assure that nodes can trust each other.
2.1. The UML model
Starting from the general deﬁnitions, a conceptual model of
privacy has been provided, using UML, in previous works (Coen-
Porisini et al., 2007, 2010a,b). In the following we provide a short
overview of such a conceptual model along with the reﬁnements
needed to take into account the speciﬁcities of WSN. The structural
aspects are deﬁned using UML classes and their relationships such
as associations, dependencies, and generalizations. Fig. 1 depicts a
class diagram that provides a high level view of the basic structural
elements of the model, while Fig. 2 shows a reﬁned class diagram
in which all the needed concepts are introduced.
A WSN Privacy Policy consists of three types of classes: Node,
Data, and Action. Thus, an instance of class WSN PrivacyPolicy is
characterized by speciﬁc instances of Node, Data, and Action, and
by the relationships among such entities. In what follows we focus
on such basic classes.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 1. The privacy policy class diagram.
(1) Node represents a member of the network either interested in
processing data or involved by such a processing. Nodes are
characterized by functions and roles. More speciﬁcally:
• Role (Ni et al., 2007) is a key concept of this approach used
to characterize nodes with respect to privacy. Thus, we intro-
duced three distinct classes extending class Role to represent
the three different roles a node can play: Subject, to rep-
resent nodes that sense data; Processor, to represent nodes
that process data by performing some kind of action on them
(e.g., transmission, forwarding, aggregation, etc.); Controller,
to represent nodes that verify the actions executed by pro-
cessors. Notice that a node can play more than one role.
• Function represents the task performed by a Node in the
network in which it operates (e.g., data sensing, mes-
sage transmission, message forwarding, data aggregation,
etc.).
(2) Data describes the information referring to subjects that is pro-
cessed by processors. Class Data is extended by means of class
Identiﬁable, which represents the information used to uniquely
identify nodes (e.g., node identiﬁer), and class Sensed, which
represents the information that is sensed by the nodes of the
network (e.g., temperature, pressure). In turn, class Sensed is
extendedby class Sensitive to represent sensed information that
deserves particular care and that should not be freely accessi-
ble. For instance, in telemedicine applications a sensitive datum
is the heart beatrate sensed by nodes positioned on the body
of patients. Notice that also some common sensed data may
deserve particular care. For example, consider a wireless meter
reading system used to monitor the environmental parameters
of a building comprising several sensor units that communi-
cate information on the current temperature and humidity of
the rooms inwhich they are installed. Although the data sensed
by the nodes cannot be classiﬁed as sensitive, they can be used
to gather information on the personal habits of people living
in the building. For instance, slight increments of temperature
or humidity may indicate the presence of one or more persons
in a room. Thus, analyzing such information a burglar can ﬁg-
ure out when (part of) the building is empty. Notice that Data
is a complex structure composed of basic information units,
named Fields, each of which represents a partial information
related to thewholedata structure. In turn, instancesofData are
aggregated into instances ofMessage. Thus, classMessage repre-
sents the basic communication unit exchanged by the nodes of
the network and may contain both Identiﬁable and Sensed data
along with plain data (i.e., instances of class Data that do not
represent identiﬁable nor sensed data). The actual structure of
messages is discussed in depth in Section 4.
(3) Action, represents any operation performed by a node. It is
extended by classes Obligation, Processing, and Purpose. Since
processing is executed under a purpose and an obligation, Pro-
cessing speciﬁes an aggregation relationship with Purpose and
Obligation. Moreover, each action can be recursively composed
of other actions. The most common actions in the context of
WSN are deﬁned in what follows:
• Sensing: Acquisition of data carried out by a node, concerning
a speciﬁc feature of the system. For instance, the value of the
temperature of the room in which the node is installed.
• Transmission: Sending a message containing data that were
sensed (or aggregated) by the current node.
• Reception: Receiving a message sent by another node of the
network.
Fig. 2. The WSN privacy class diagram.
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Fig. 3. Network topology.
• Forwarding: Sending a message previously received by the
node, that is the message contains data that were Sensed (or
aggregated) by other nodes of the network.
• Veriﬁcation: Checking the integrity of the data contained in
a received message. In this case it may be useful to associate
such an actionwith one ormore obligations in order tomodel
the fact that whenever an inconsistency is found some coun-
termeasures, such as sending an alertmessage to the sink, are
taken.
• Data aggregation: Aggregating received and/or sensed data.
In order to guaranteedata conﬁdentiality and integrity aswell as
to assure that only authorizednodes can access data and/or execute
actions, the model deﬁnes encryption mechanisms. More specif-
ically, two classes representing encryption keys, named DataKey
and FunctionRoleKey, are introduced. The former class is used to
protect the data content of messages, and therefore each node of
the network owns a (possibly) differentDataKey to encrypt the data
content of its messages. The latter class is used to guarantee that
message communication and data handling are executed only by
authorized nodes. In fact, each action is associated with a function-
role pair and therefore requires a given FunctionRoleKey in order
to be executed. Thus, only nodes having the corresponding Func-
tionRoleKey can execute a given action. Notice that since a node
may play different functions and roles, it may own more than one
function-role key.
3. The DyDAP approach
Let us consider a dense network composed of N nodes, all of
which sensing the same type of data (e.g., temperature, humidity).
Moreover, nodes can exchange messages among them and there-
fore sensed data (possibly aggregated) eventually reach the sink
(Baronti et al., 2007). In other words, each node can act as a source
of data and/or as a forwarding element. In the former case trafﬁc
is locally generated at the sensor node, whereas in the latter case
trafﬁc comes from other nodes. The network architecture is shown
in Fig. 3.
We assume that nodes are aware of their own geographical
position and that they implement a CSMA-like MAC protocol for
accessing the wireless channel (Walke et al., 2006). The broad-
cast nature of wireless channel enables a node to determine, by
overhearing the channel, whether its messages are received and
forwarded by its neighbors (Zhanga et al., 2007). Moreover, we
assume that nodes are equipped with a transmission buffer, in
which messages may be queued before being transmitted over the
networkandwithastorage tablewheremessages canbestored (the
utility of this feature is explained in thenext section).Whenever the
node message input rate, which is given by local plus transit trafﬁc
rates, exceeds the message forwarding rate at MAC layer (which
depends on the MAC protocol, the radio channel and the network
topology), messages are queued in the transmission buffer. Thus,
if no countermeasure is taken upon the saturation of the message
forwarding rate, the transmission queue builds up till itsmaximum
limit and, as a consequence, message losses arise due to trafﬁc con-
gestion. Message losses have two negative effects: (i) they waste
energy resources; (ii) they can severely impair the estimation accu-
racy of the system. Since it is very difﬁcult to regulate the message
forwarding rate, the reduction of the input trafﬁc rate is the only
possible reaction to a network congestion (as in wired networks
Jacobson, 1988).
The approach presented in this paper exploits data aggregation
at node level to avoid trafﬁc congestion: when the transmission
queue builds up, data therein are aggregated in order to keep the
queue length under its maximum limit. Notice that, as far as net-
work congestion is concerned, this is equivalent to reduce the node
message input rate.
Aggregating data is not equivalent to collecting individual sen-
sor readings and thus it may not be used in applications in which
the latter are necessary (e.g., perimeter control). However,in many
applications (such as temperature or sysmic activity monitoring
systems) the emphasis is on statistical data and therefore data
aggregation can be used to avoid trafﬁc congestion. For example, if
the goal is to determine the mean or the variance of sensed data,
aggregation can be carried out by simply adding up values.1
In order to meet privacy and end-to-end security requirements,
encryption techniques are used, that is the content of all messages
is encrypted before being transmitted over the network. However,
the main drawback of this approach is that it may be necessary to
decrypt messages before any aggregation process may take place.
To overcome such a problem it is possible to use homomorphic
stream ciphers such as the one presented by Castelluccia et al.
(2005), which allows efﬁcient aggregation of encrypted data. In
fact, an homomorphic encryption scheme allows arithmetic oper-
ations to be performed on ciphertexts. For instance, the addition of
two ciphertexts followedby a decryption operation yields the same
result as the addition of the two corresponding plaintext values.
In this way it would be possible to aggregate encrypted messages
without decrypting them in advance.
Inwhat followswediscuss the theoretical foundations onwhich
the DyDAP framework is built, by presenting the way in which the
transmission queue is controlled and by shortly reporting how the
algorithm of Castelluccia et al. works.
3.1. Controlling the transmission queue
In order to keep the overall network load under a reasonable
level, messages in the transmission buffer are aggregated as soon
as the queue length starts building up. Messages, generated by the
aggregation process, are then forwarded through the network and
can be further aggregated by next nodes along the path to the
sink. The total amount of data to aggregate is periodically com-
puted by each node using a control theoretic approach (Astrom and
Wittenmark, 1995) that drives the transmission queue towards a
constant reference point. The selection of messages to aggregate
and the aggregation procedureswill be described later on (see Data
Aggregation Protocol).
Let ϕ(tj) be the queue length associated with a transmission
buffer at the time instant tj, which represents the beginning of the
1 To compute the mean it is necessary to add up the measured data, while for
variance it is necessary to add up also the square of such values (Castelluccia et al.,
2005).
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Fig. 4. Block diagram of the controlled system.
jth sampling interval. In the discrete-timedomain, its dynamics can
be modeled by the following linear model:
ϕ(tj+1) = ϕ(tj) + (tj) − u(tj) + uV (tj) (1)
where, with reference to the jth sampling interval, (tj)≥0 is the
number of messages enqueued, u(tj)≥0 is the number of transmit-
ted messages; uV(tj)≤0, computed by DyDAP models the control
action, i.e., its absolute value |uV(tj)| is the number ofmessages that
have to be removed from the queue using aggregation techniques.
More speciﬁcally, (tj) is a function of the input trafﬁc load at
the queue, generated from the source nodes, and it may change
with time; instead, u(tj) depends on the MAC protocol. Both (tj)
and u(tj) affect the queue length in a way that cannot be forecast
in advance. For this reason, they will be modeled as disturbances
(Boggia et al., 2007).
To avoid buffer overﬂows, at each sampling time tj, it is nec-
essary to compute the amount |uV(tj)| of messages that should be
virtually removed from the queue. The approach is based on the
feedback control loop pictured in Fig. 4. In such a scheme, the ref-
erence queue level ϕT is compared against the actual queue level
ϕ(tj) and the resulting error e(tj) = ϕT − ϕ(tj) is fed into a Pro-
portional Integral (PI) regulator, with transfer function Gc(z), to
compute uV(tj). A PI controller has been chosen because it is able to
ﬁlter out the continuous component of the disturbance (tj)−u(tj)
(Astrom and Wittenmark, 1995; Boggia et al., 2007).
The transfer function of the PI controller, computed as the
Z-transform of its discrete-time pulse response (Astrom and
Wittenmark, 1995), is given by
GC (z) = ˇ ·
(
1 + 1
T
z
z − 1
)
(2)
where ˇ and T are non negative constants.
To tune thePI regulator, the following theoremhasbeenderived.
Theorem 1. The system, shown in Fig. 4, is asymptotically stable if
and only if the following inequalities are satisﬁed:⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 < ˇ < 2
ˇ
T
> 0
4 − 2ˇ − ˇ
T
> 0
(3)
Proof. The demonstration can be easily derived by applying the
Jury criterion (Astrom and Wittenmark, 1995) to the characteristic
polynomial p(z) = T(z−1)2 +ˇ(T+1)z−ˇT of the control system in
Fig. 4.
3.2. Privacy in end-to-end secure aggregated data
The algorithm of Castelluccia et al. (2005) is based on a sim-
ple and secure additively homomorphic stream cipher that allows
efﬁcient aggregation of encrypted data. Homomorphic encryption
schemes are especially useful in scenarios where someone, having
no decryption keys, needs to perform arithmetic operations on a
set of ciphertexts.
The cipher uses modular additions and is therefore very well
suited for CPU-constrained devices like sensors. Moreover, aggre-
gation based on this cipher can be used to efﬁciently compute
statistical values such as mean, variance, and standard deviation
of sensed data, enabling signiﬁcant bandwidth gain.
The main idea of Castelluccia et al. (2005) is to replace the
XOR (Exclusive-OR) operation, typically found in stream ciphers,
with modular addition. For reader convenience, we will brieﬂy
sketch the additively homomorphic encryption scheme proposed
in Castelluccia et al. (2005) by applying it in the context of WSN.
Let us consider a network comprising N nodes, each of which is
uniquely identiﬁed by a label ni, 1≤ i≤N. Moreover let di denote
an integer number representing the data generated by node ni,
where di ∈ [0 ;M−1] and M is a large enough integer, whose value
is discussed later on.
Moreover, each node ni owns a different key k(ni, fr), where
fr represents the Function-Role pair played by ni. According to
the model presented in Section 2 fr∈ {SS, AP, TP, NC}, where SS
represents Sensing-Subject, AP represents Authenticator-Processor,
TP represents Transmitter-Processor and NC represents Notiﬁer-
Controller. For instance, the Sensing-Subject key of node n1 is
represented by k(n1, SS). Finally, let Enc and Dec denote the encryp-
tion and decryption functions, respectively. Enc (Dec) takes as
arguments the plaintext to be encrypted (the ciphertext to be
decrypted) and the key.
Thus, the encrypted ciphertext of datum di generated by node
ni is given by
ci = Enc(di, k(ni, SS)) = (di + k(ni, SS)) (modM). (4)
The aggregation of J different ciphertexts c1, . . ., cJ received from
other nodes is carried out in the following way:
caggr =
J∑
i=1
ci (modM) (5)
Since the above encryption scheme is additively homomorphic,
we have that if c1 =Enc(d1, k(n1, SS)) and c2 =Enc(d2, k(n2, SS)) then
c1 + c2 =Enc(d1 +d2, k(n1, SS) + k(n2, SS)).
As a consequence, the cleartext of the aggregated data daggr can
then be obtained by:
daggr = Dec(caggr, k) = caggr − k(modM); k =
J∑
i=1
k(ni, SS). (6)
Notice that in order to ensure correctness of the above schemaM
should be larger than
∑N
i=1di. In fact, if such a constraint is satisﬁed,
decryptionwill result in avalued* that is smaller thanM. Inpractice,
if p=max {di}, then M should not be smaller than (M=2log2(p·N)).
The keystream k can be generated using a stream cipher, such as
RC4, keyed with a node secret key and a unique message. Finally,
each sensor node shares a unique secret key with the sink of the
WSN. Such keys are derived from a master secret (known only to
the sink) and distributed to the sensor nodes. However, the key
distribution protocol is outside the scope of this work.
4. The DyDAP framework
This section presents the integrated framework DyDAP whose
goal is to provide an end-to-end data aggregation scheme with
privacy capabilities for WSN. Thus, in what follows we provide a
thorough discussion of the message structure, the protocols and
the algorithms used in DyDAP to meet the above mentioned goals.
4.1. Message structure
A message is the basic communication unit exchanged by the
nodes of the network, that is a message refers to a single transmis-
sion hop between adjacent nodes. In what follows messages are
denoted by mn,q, where n indicates the node that generated and
Author's personal copy
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transmitted the message, while q uniquely identiﬁes the message
among those generated by node n.
According to the model described in Section 2 messages may
contain data the can be further classiﬁed as Identiﬁable or Sensed.
Identiﬁable data include the information that can be used to iden-
tify a node, while Sensed data include all information sensed by
the nodes. Finally, in what follows we refer to data being neither
Identiﬁable nor Sensed as plain data.
A sensed data, before reaching the sink, passes through differ-
ent nodes of the network (multi-hop communication) by means
of different messages. In order to guarantee the integrity and con-
ﬁdentiality of the end-to-end communication, we use a message
structure that keeps track of both the last and the second last hops
of the transmission. A DyDAP message mn,q is deﬁned as a tuple in
which all ﬁelds, unless otherwise speciﬁed, are ciphered.
mn,q = 〈curr, prev, sub, data, varD, pos, varP, encP, err, sensId, errId, idList〉
where:
• curr is the couple (n, q) that identiﬁes the currentmessage among
those transmitted over the network.
• prev is the couple (np, qp), where np is the node that operated
the second last forwarding of the sensed data contained in the
current message, and qp identiﬁes such a message among those
transmitted by np.
• sub is the couple (ns, qs), where ns identiﬁes the Subject node, that
is the node that either sensed or aggregated the data, and qs iden-
tiﬁes such a message among those transmitted by ns. Notice that
in caseof errornotiﬁcation (seeReceptionand IntegrityVeriﬁcation
Protocol) ns identiﬁes the node that discovered the error.
• data is the data either sensed or aggregated by the node described
by sub.
• varD is the variance associated with data.
• pos is the couple (x, y) describing the geographical position of the
node described by sub. This ﬁeld is in clear.
• varP is the variance associated with pos. This ﬁeld is in clear.
• encP is a ciphered ﬁeld containing the same information as pos.
It is included in order to detect any modiﬁcation of pos possibly
made by a malicious node.
• err is set to 1 whenever an error is detected, otherwise it is set to
0.
• sensId is the couple (ns, qs) that in case of error notiﬁcation iden-
tiﬁes the node that either sensed or aggregated the correct data
and the identiﬁer of the message transmitted by such a node.
• errId is the couple (nm, qm) that identiﬁes the node that generated
the error message and the identiﬁer of the message reporting the
error transmitted by such a node.
• idList is a list of nodes that processed the original data. It is used
by the sink in order to identify the keys required in the decryp-
tion process of data. Depending on the Maximum Transfer Unit
(MTU) of the underlying communication technology, the size of
this list is upper bounded. For now on, we will refer to idM as the
maximum number of IDs that can be concatenated to form the
idList.
Notice that sensId and errId are used only in case of error noti-
ﬁcation, i.e., when err is set to 1, and that the encryption of the
ﬁelds curr, prev and sub besides supporting integrity, guarantees
anonymity.
Referring to themodelof Section2,ﬁelds curr,prev, sub,pos,varP,
encP, sensId, errId and idList are instances of class Identiﬁable, while
data and varD of class Sensed. The remaining ﬁelds are instances of
class Data, that is they represent plain data. Moreover, curr, prev,
sub, pos, encP, sensId, errId are composed of two different instances
of class Field, while data, varD, varP and err contain one instance of
class Field.
In what follows we introduce two possibly different encrypt-
ing (decrypting) functions denoted by Enc and Enc* (Dec and Dec*).
Functions Enc and Dec must provide an homomorphic encryption
schema as introduced in Section 3, while functions Enc* and Dec*
may not.2
4.2. DyDAP protocols
Messages are transmitted over the network by nodes sensing
data from the environment inwhich they are located.Messages are
then received by other nodes (at 1 hop distance) that may forward
them, verify their integrity or aggregate a set of received messages,
generating in this way a new message.
Nodes storepart of themessages in their local table before trans-
mitting themover the network. In particular the ﬁelds stored in the
local table, using ﬁeld curr as hash key, are prev, sub, data and encP.
This is done to allow a node, upon reception of a message, to iden-
tify whether the received message was previously transmitted by
the node itself as discussed later on (see Section 4.2.2).
Notice that stored messages3 are removed from the local table
after a ﬁxed time that has to be greater than S *T, where S denotes
the size of the table and T the maximum time elapsing between
thegenerationof twoconsecutivemessages. Since the size of stored
messages size is much smaller than the size of transmitted mes-
sages, it is very unlikely that the local table overﬂows.
In this section we present the following protocols:
• Sensing, which deﬁnes the actions that a node carries out when
sensing data.
• Message Reception and Integrity Veriﬁcation, which deﬁnes the
actions carried out when receiving a message.
• Data aggregation, which comprises the actions that a node carries
out to aggregate received messages into a new message.
4.2.1. Sensing
Let n be a node sensing a data d from the environment where
it is located. Moreover, let us assume that the position of n is rep-
resented by the coordinates (xn, yn). According to the function-role
classiﬁcation, when sensing d the node acts as a Sensing-Subject
(SS) and therefore the node encrypts d using the key k(n, SS). Let q
denote the number of messages that n already transmitted over
the network. Thus, the message mn,q+1 is prepared according to
the structure discussed in the previous section. Notice that, when
preparing themessage the node acts as a Transmitter-Processor (TP)
and therefore all the cyphered ﬁelds but data are encrypted using
the key k(n, TP).
mn,q+1 = 〈curr, prev, sub, data, varD, pos, varP, encP, err, sensId, errId, idList〉
where
curr= (Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP))),
prev=,4
sub= (Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP)),
data=Enc(d, k(n, SS)),
varD=0,
pos= (xn, yn),
varP=0
encP= (Enc(xn, k(n, TP)), (Enc(yn, k(n, TP))))5
2 This means that Enc and Enc* (Dec and Dec*) may or may not be the same
function.
3 A stored message is the part of a transmitted message that is locally stored.
4  denotes an empty ﬁeld.
5 Since coordinates have a ﬁnite representation, we assume, for the sake of sim-
plicity, that they are represented by integer numbers.
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err=0,
sensId=,
errId=,
idList= [(Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP)))]
Once ready mn,q+1 is copied into the local table6 and then it is
queued in the transmission buffer.
4.2.2. Message Reception and Integrity Veriﬁcation
Let n be a node receiving a message mj,h, and let q be the num-
ber of messages already transmitted by n over the network. The
message is analyzed to ﬁnd out whether it was originally transmit-
ted by the node itself. This can be done searching the local table
using the content of ﬁeld prev as hash key. If the search succeeds,
then mj,h was transmitted by node n and therefore it can verify the
integrity of the received message. Instead, if the search fails node n
has to re-transmit themessage over the network. Notice that in the
former case n acts as a Notiﬁer-Controller (NC), while in the latter it
acts as a Transmitter-Processor (TP).
1. Forwarding messages
A new message mn,q+1 is therefore prepared by setting ﬁeld
curr to
(Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP))) andﬁeldprev to the value
of ﬁeld curr of the received message. All the others ﬁelds are set
to the value of the corresponding ﬁeld in the received message.
Once ready mn,q+1 is copied into the local table and then it is
queued in the transmission buffer.
2. Verifying the integrity
Thenodeveriﬁes the integrity of the receivedmessageby com-
paring it with the information retrieved from its local table. This
is done by checking whether ﬁelds data and encP of the received
messagematchwith the corresponding ﬁelds retrieved from the
local table. If they do then message integrity is preserved and
therefore the received message can be dropped. Instead, if they
do not then the received message should be considered as cor-
rupted and therefore the node transmits over the network an
error message structured as follows:
mn,q+1 = 〈curr, prev, sub, data, varD, pos, varP, encP, err, sensId, errId, idList〉
where
curr= (Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP))),
prev=,
sub= (Enc*(n, k(n, TP)), Enc*(q+1, k(n, TP))),
data=Enc(LocTab .data, k(n, NC)),
varD=0,
pos= (xn, yn),
varP=0,
encP=Enc(LocTab . encP, k(n, NC)), 7
err=1,
sensId= LocTab . sub,
errId=mj,h . curr,
idList=mj,h . idList
where mj,h . f denotes the ﬁeld f of message mj,h and LocTab . f
denotes the ﬁeld f retrieved from the local table.
Notice that ﬁeld prev is left empty to avoid loopswith themali-
cious node and/or the spreading of different and opposite error
messages; ﬁeld sub identiﬁes the node that found the error (i.e.,
noden); ﬁeld sensId equals the content of ﬁeld sub retrieved from
6 Only some of the ﬁelds are actually stored as explained at the beginning of this
section.
7 Function Enc is applied to both values of ﬁeld encP resulting in a new pair of
encrypted values.
Fig. 5. Message searching range.
the local table and thereforeprovides informationonwhichnode
originally sensedor aggregated thedatum;ﬁeld errId equals ﬁeld
curr of the received message to provide information on where
the error occurred; error is set to 1 to indicate that the cur-
rent message is an error message. The ﬁelds data and encP equal
the corresponding ﬁelds retrieved from the local table and are
encrypted with the Notiﬁer-Controller key k(n, NC). Finally, the
new message is queued in the transmission buffer once it has
been copied in the local table.
4.2.3. Data aggregation
Whenever the number of messages in the transmission buffer
exceeds a given threshold messages are aggregated in order to
avoid buffer overﬂow. Inwhat followswe discuss theway inwhich
messages to be aggregated are selected, how the aggregation pro-
cessworks andﬁnally howanewaggregatedmessage is structured.
1. Messages selection
The messages selection procedure iteratively operates to
arrange enqueuedmessages in a suitable number of aggregation
groups. Then themessagesof eachaggregationgrouparemerged
into a single message. As a result the number of messages in the
transmission buffer decreases. Notice that error messages (i.e.,
messages having the ﬁeld err set to 1) are not considered.
The goal is to decrease the length of the transmission queue,
at a given instant tj of |uV(tj)| messages (see Section 3.1). Since at
the end of the aggregation process A new aggregated messages
will be inserted in the queue, in order to guarantee that at the
end of the aggregation process the queue length decreases of
|uV| messages it is necessary to remove |uV| +A messages. The
value A is not predictable in advance, but it is computed using
the following iterative procedure.
For each message m stored in the transmission buffer, let
m . group be a variable whose initial value is 0. Let A denote the
number of aggregation groups found, whose initial value equals
1. Finally, let dynamicList be a list of messages initially empty.
During the ﬁrst iteration, we look for messages generated by
nodes whose position falls within a circular area of radius R
(which is a parameter of the DyDAP algorithm) whose center
is given by the position of the ﬁrst message in the buffer (see
Fig. 5). All the found messages are marked as belonging to the
ﬁrst aggregation group by setting to 1 their variable group. Fur-
thermore, all these messages are put in dynamicList.
Let num be the number of messages in dynamicList, that is the
number of messages that can be removed from the transmis-
sion buffer. If num is smaller than |uV| +A (i.e., it is not enough
to remove from the queue num messages), a new aggregation
group is created. This is done by incrementing A and iterating
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Fig. 6. Steps of the message searching procedure. (a) First iteration; (b) second
iteration.
the procedure. Thus, during the next iteration, the procedure
looks for the ﬁrst message in the queue that still has group equal
to 0. Then it sets group to A and uses the value in ﬁeld pos as the
center of the new area of radius R in which looking for messages
to be aggregated. To avoid that the same message is aggregated
into more than one group, only messages having group equal to
0 are taken into account.
This is repeated until the number ofmessages in dynamicList is
equal to |uV| +Aor all themessageshavebeenassigned to groups.
When this condition is satisﬁed the procedure terminates and
messages are aggregated as described in the following step.
Fig. 6 shows how the messages selection procedure works. In
the example, 5messages have to be removed from thequeue, i.e.,
uV =−5. At the end of the ﬁrst iteration, A=1 and the number of
messages with group equal to 1 is 4, that is the ﬁrst aggregation
group is made up of 4 messages. Moreover, dynamicList contains
suchmessages and since they are less than |uV| +A, theprocedure
is iteratedwithA incremented by 1. At the end of the second iter-
ation 3messages have been selectedwith variable group equal to
2. Thus, dynamicList contains 3 more messages, i.e., the number
of messages that are strictly required to reach the target |uV| +A.
2. Data aggregation
Messages in dynamicList, having the same group value, are
joined together and therefore a new message is generated for
each aggregation group.
Let be G an aggregation group composed of J different mes-
sages. The ﬁelds data and pos of the aggregated message are
computed as a weighted encrypted sum of the corresponding
values in the J messages in G. In particular, the weight of the
ith message (wi, i = 1, . . . , J) equals the size of the ﬁeld idList.
As a consequence, the weight w of a message resulting from the
aggregation of J different messages is equal to the sum of the
weights of each joined message, that is:
w =
J∑
i=1
wi (7)
According to Eq. (5) the following expressions hold for ﬁelds
data, pos and encP:
data =
J∑
i=1
wimi.data, (8)
pos =
(
1
w
J∑
i=1
wimi.pos.x,
1
w
J∑
i=1
wimi.pos.y
)
, (9)
encP =
(
1
w
J∑
i=1
wimi.encP.x,
1
w
J∑
i=1
wimi.encP.y
)
(10)
where mi denotes the ith message in the aggregation list.
Furthermore, the variances of data and position of the aggre-
gated messages can be computed. In particular, considering Eq.
(8), the variance of the data equals (Papoulis, 1991):
varD = 1
w − 1
J∑
i=1
[
(wi − 1)2di + wid
2
i
]
− w
w − 1data
2 (11)
where di and di denote the value of ﬁelds data and varD of the i-
th message in the aggregation list. Similarly, it is possible also to
compute varP. The values of the variance measure the accuracy
of the information resulting from the aggregation.
3. Message structure
The newmessage mn,q+1 generated by node n, assuming that it
has already transmitted q messages over the network, is struc-
tured as follows:
mn,q+1 = 〈curr, prev, sub, data, varD, pos, varP, encP, err, sensId, errId, idList〉
where
curr= (Enc * (n, k(n, TP)), Enc * (q+1, k(n, TP))),
prev=,
sub= (Enc * (n, k(n, TP)), Enc * (q+1, k(n, TP))),
data= see Eq. (8),
varD= see Eq. (11),
pos= see Eq. (9),
varP= as in Eq. (11),
encP= see Eq. (10),
err=0,
sensId=,
errId=,
idList =
⋃J
i=imi.idList
Notice that ﬁelds curr and sub show which node carried out
the aggregation process, while ﬁeld prev is empty since this is a
new message. Fields varD, pos, data and varP are set according
to Eqs. (8)–(11). Finally, ﬁeld idList is obtained by merging the
corresponding ﬁelds of the J messages involved in the aggrega-
tion process. Once built the message is copied in the local table
before being enqueued in the transmission buffer.
4. Dealing with an upper bound on packet size
So far, the description of the aggregation algorithm has been
outlined under the implicit assumption that the size of aggre-
gated packets is smaller than the maximum allowed one. We
recall that the size of aggregated packets depends on the num-
ber of entries in idList. It is easy to take into account an upper
boundonpacket sizeby simply stopping the creationof anaggre-
gation group as soon as the total number of IDs exceeds idM,
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which is the maximum number of IDs that can be stored in the
list.
4.3. Towards policy enforcement and trust
Privacy policy enforcement consists in verifying the compliance
of the actions performed by nodes with a given privacy policy. In
general, there are two ways in which such a veriﬁcation can be
carried out: the ﬁrst way consists in providing ex-post enforce-
ment mechanisms, that is the controls are done after all the actions
related to a policy are performed (e.g., audit-based mechanisms).
The second one consists in having run-time enforcement mecha-
nisms that is, the effect of every action is checked before actual
execution.
The Message Reception and Integrity Veriﬁcation Protocol imple-
ments an ex-post mechanism since the node checks the integrity
of the received message with the obligation of sending an
error message to the sink in case a corrupted message is
detected.
Instead, run-time enforcements could be implemented by
adding trust management mechanisms. In such a case a new key
has to be used to assure that communication takes place only
among authorizednodes belonging to thenetwork. In fact, a further
requirement concerning (communication) trust states that only
authorized nodes are allowed to communicate within the system.
This requirement can be satisﬁed by introducing an Authenticator-
Processor (AP) key known by every node of the network. As a
consequence a node can encrypt messages with the AP key, assur-
ing in thisway that the transmitter is a trusted node of the network.
The main drawback consists in the fact that a node receiving a
message needs to decrypt it (using the AP key) before any pro-
cessing can occur. Notice that this mechanism prevents external
untrusted nodes from both accessing messages that are traveling
across the network and transmitting malicious messages over the
network.
Although the above technique can improve the level of
trust among the nodes of the network, it requires relevant
computational and power resources, since the number of encryp-
tions/decryptions is equal to the number of message transmissions
and receptions. Hence, this solution could be applied to the
next generation of sensor technologies (Akyildiz et al., 2008;
She and Yeow, 2006) and to hybrid architectures, such as
those composed of mesh networks and WSN (Sicari and Riggio,
2009).
5. Performance evaluation
This section discusses the effectiveness of the DyDAP approach
with respect to data accuracy and end-to-end secure data aggre-
gation by showing the results of several simulations. In particular,
we analyze transmission buffer overﬂow, estimation accuracy, and
energy consumption.
Notice that the features of DyDAP concerning privacy such as
anonymity and data integrity are not the target of such simulations
even though they are achieved by means of the protocols investi-
gated herein. In fact, privacy management depends on the design
choices made in order to develop DyDAP according to the privacy
model described in Section 2.
As a result only data accuracy and end-to-end secure data aggre-
gation are tested bymeans of computer simulations that reproduce
a real application context. The results show that DyDAP is able
to exploit end-to-end secure aggregation to face network conges-
tion while providing, at the same time, a high sensing accuracy.
Finally, it has been also shown that DyDAP exhibits a negligible
Fig. 7. Sensor ﬁeld.
sensitivity with respect to the parameters qT, K, and T of the control
algorithm.
5.1. The example
Thechosenexample is a temperaturemonitoringproblembased
on real data traces, obtained from the 1968 Lone Pine Canyon (CA,
USA) wildﬁre (DeBano et al., 2011). We considered this use-case in
order to test DyDAP in a real-world strenuous scenario with large
temperature excursions. This can be considered aworst case study;
in fact, when the monitored ﬁeld exhibits strong variations, esti-
mation errors due to network congestion can severely impair WSN
monitoring accuracy. The simulations were carried out using the
Castalia simulator, v.1.3 (Castalia, 2011), considering a sensors ﬁeld
having a 500m×100m rectangular shape has shown in Fig. 7 and
assuming that sensor nodes are equipped with the Texas Instru-
ments (http://www.ti.com) radio transceiver CC2420. The default
Castalia gradient-based routingalgorithmhasbeenused (Watteyne
et al., 2010), setting up a tree topology having the sink as root node.
The values of the parameters used for the simulations are
reported in Table 1.
In order to exploit the header compression gain due to 6LoW-
PAN standard, we have encapsulated DyDAP messages in a IPv6
over IEEE 802.15.4 stack as speciﬁed in standards (Montenegro
et al., 2007; Kushalnagar et al., 2007). Notice that according to such
standards the maximum packet size equals 127 bytes. However,
during all simulations the actual packet size did not exceed such a
maximum even when data aggregation was carried out.
5.2. Parameter sensitivity of DyDAP
To investigate theparameter sensitivity ofDyDAP,wehave eval-
uated key performance indexes such as the relative estimation
error, the ratio of lost packets, and the number of transmitted pack-
ets by varying qT, K and T parameters according to Table 1. Results
show negligible variations of the WSN behavior with respect to
the parameter sets. In particular, Figs. 8 and 9 report the mean
value of the absolute relative error in temperature estimationand
Table 1
Parameters for simulations.
Parameter Description Value
N Number of nodes [56, 500]
A Sensor ﬁeld size 500m×100m
CB Buffer capacity 100 messages
tP Acquisition period 1; 1.5; 2 s
qT Target queue level 70–90% CB
K Constant of PI controller {0.5, 1}
T Constant of PI controller {1, 4, 8}
R Data aggregation range 30m
tn Sampling time of DyDAP 500ms
tS Duration of simulation 240 s
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Fig. 8. Mean absolute relative of DyDAP for several parameter sets (tP =1 s).
Fig. 9. Overall number of transmitted messages using DyDAP for several parameter
sets (tP =1 s).
Table 2
Parameter set labels.
Set qT K T
S1 70% CB 0.5 1
S2 70% CB 0.5 4
S3 70% CB 0.5 8
S4 70% CB 1 1
S5 70% CB 1 4
S6 70% CB 1 8
S7 80% CB 0.5 1
S8 80% CB 0.5 4
S9 80% CB 0.5 8
S10 80% CB 1 1
S11 80% CB 1 4
S12 80% CB 1 8
S13 90% CB 0.5 1
S14 90% CB 0.5 4
S15 90% CB 0.5 8
S16 90% CB 1 1
S17 90% CB 1 4
S18 90% CB 1 8
the overall number of messages transmitted in the WSN, respec-
tively. Values are obtained using the DyDAP algorithm for tP =1 s.8
In Figs. 8 and 9, we refer to each parameter set by using a label Si
on the x-axis where i refers to the ith set of Table 2.
8 Results obtained for other values of tP have not been shownbecause very similar
to those already reported here.
Fig. 10. Dynamic evolution of a queue with and without DyDAP algorithm.
Fig. 11. Percentage of lost packets when DyDAP is not used.
5.3. Simulations results
In what follows, unless otherwise speciﬁed, we refer to results
obtained using parameter set S10 without loss of generality. The
ﬁrst simulation, whose results are reported in Fig. 10, shows the
dynamic evolution of the queue of a sensor node in a simulated
network with N = 300, and tP = 1 s. It can be seen that the use of the
proposed congestion control algorithm, based on data aggregation,
avoids buffer saturation. In fact, the queue level is always around
the target queue level of buffer capacity. Instead, when DyDAP is
not used, the transmission buffer very often overﬂows, with a con-
sequent increase of themessage loss rate. This is clearly shown also
in Fig. 11 which reports the ratio of lost packets when DyDAP is not
used.
To evaluate the improvement in the estimation accuracy caused
by the reduction of the loss rate, we have compared the actual data
of the temperature ﬁeld with those estimated by the sink when
DyDAP is turned on and off, respectively. Fig. 12 reports the mean
and maximum values for the absolute relative error of the temper-
ature estimations (i.e., the absolute value of the ratio among the
temperature estimation error and the real temperature value).9
The simulations have been carried out using different values for
tP (1 s, 1.5 s and 2 s). The results show that accuracy decreases by
increasing the number of nodes because of network congestion and
that DyDAP data aggregation provides a great beneﬁt in term of
accuracy.
To provide a further insight on this very important issue, Fig. 13
reports the mean of the absolute relative estimation error, reg-
istered at each sensor node position, in the case of N=225 and
9 In these diagrams we have averaged, over all sensor nodes, the mean (or the
maximum) of the absolute relative estimation errors.
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Fig. 12. Absolute relative error between the actual sensed values from the sensor
nodes and the received values from the sink node. (a) Mean error; (b) maximum
error.
tP =1 s. The color of each node represents the mean of the abso-
lute relative estimation error measured in the node position. The
error is represented in a gray scale: black (white) corresponds to
100% (0%). This provides information about the spatial distribu-
tion of the estimation error showing that network congestion can
severely impair the WSN behavior. In fact, without using DyDAP
data aggregation almost half of the sensor nodes provides an esti-
mation error very close to 100% due to lostmessages (dark nodes in
Fig. 13a).
In the considered ﬁre detection scenario it is also important to
show how the estimated and real temperatures differ over time:
Figs. 14 and 15 report the actual temperature values and the ones
estimated by the sink using aggregated data: the gain in estimation
accuracy is very impressive. For example, for Node 0, without using
DyDAPdata aggregation, (see Fig. 14a) the temperature peak is fully
missedbecause thenetwork congestiondoesnot allowmessages to
be delivered to the sink. Thus, without using DyDAP the estimation
accuracy is so bad that the entire WSN misses its sensing target.
Finally, to evaluate energy consumption we analyzed the
number of messages that each node in the network transmits
(retransmissions included) since transmission is the most energy
consuming task of a sensor node. Fig. 16 reports the number of
transmitted messages, in different operative conditions, showing
that using DyDAP a slightly smaller number of messages is trans-
mitted.
In conclusion, DyDAP avoids network congestion and therefore
greatly improves estimation accuracy, without increasing in a sig-
niﬁcant way the amount of energy required.
6. Related works
WSN applications require to collect a large amount of data and,
due to the limited resources in terms of power of sensor nodes, it
is necessary to aggregate such data in order to reduce the amount
of transmitted information. The wireless nature of the communi-
cation channel along with the remote access increase the risk of
attacks that can lead to violations of privacy, integrity and conﬁ-
dentiality. In particular the following common threats may occur
(Gruteser et al., 2003; Chan and Perrig, 2003):
• Eavesdropping: a malicious user could easily discover the com-
munication content by listening to the communication occurring
among nodes.
• Masking: a malicious node may mask its real nature behind the
identity of a node that is authorized to take part to the commu-
nication in order to misroute messages.
In order to preserve privacy inWSN, the available solutionsmay
be classiﬁed into two main groups: anonymity mechanisms based
on data cloaking (Gruteser et al., 2003; Priyantha et al., 2000) and
privacy policy based approaches (Duri et al., 2000).
The former approach is based on perturbing data following
some kind of criterion, for instance K-anonymity guarantees that
every record is indistinguishable from at least k−1 other records
(Samarati and Sweeney, 1998). In Gruteser et al. (2003), Priyantha
et al. (2000), Gruteser and Grunwald (2003), and Smailagic et al.
(2001) four main data cloaking anonymity approaches (Gruteser
et al., 2003; Gruteser and Grunwald, 2003 speciﬁc for cloaking
localization information) are proposed:
• Decentralize sensible data: the basic idea of this approach is to
distribute the sensed location data through a spanning tree, so
that no single node holds the complete view of the original data.
• Secure communication channel: the use of a secure communica-
tion protocols, such as SPINS (Perrig et al., 2002), reduces the
eavesdropping and active attack risk by means of encryption
techniques.
• Change data trafﬁc: the trafﬁc pattern is alteredwith some bogus
data that obfuscate the real position of the nodes.
• Nodemobility: the basic idea is tomove the sensor nodes in order
to change dynamically the localization information, making it
difﬁcult to identify the node.
For instance, Gruteser et al. (2003) propose a solution that
guarantees the anonymous usage of location based information.
More speciﬁcally, such a solution consists of a cloaking algorithm
that regulates the granularity of location information to meet the
speciﬁed anonymity constraints. This work focuses on localiza-
tion services and therefore constrains the middleware architecture
needed to support the proposed algorithm. Hence, such a solution
cannot be considered a general context independent anonymity
approach.
Privacy policy based approaches (Duri et al., 2000; Langheinrich,
2002; Snekkenes, 2001) state who can use individuals data,
which data can be collected, for what purpose the data can be
used, and how they can be distributed. A common policy based
approach addresses privacy concerns at database layer after data
have been collected (Snekkenes, 2001). Other works (Molnar and
Wagner, 2004) address issues such as access control and authen-
tication. Duri et al. (2000) propose a policy-based framework for
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Fig. 13. Spatial distribution of the average relative estimation error (N=300 and tp =1 s). (a) Without DyDAP; (b) with DyDAP.
Fig. 14. Relative error between the actual sensed values from the sensor node and the received value from the sink node (N=225, tp =1 s). (a) Node 57 without DyDAP; (b)
Node 57 with DyDAP.
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Fig. 15. Relative error between the actual sensed values from the sensor node and the received value from the sink node (N=300, tp =1 s). (a) Node 227 without DyDAP; (b)
Node 227 with DyDAP.
protecting sensor information. The Mist routing project for mobile
users (Al-Muhtadi et al., 2002) combines locationprivacywithcom-
munication aspects. It faces the source location privacy problem by
designing ad hoc routing protocol that keeps the location private
from source to routers.
Our work provides a contribution in the ﬁeld of privacy by
deﬁning a role-based context-independent solution that guaran-
tees nodes anonymity before data are collected into a database.
Thus, our solutionmay be combinedwith both data cloakingmech-
anisms and some other privacy policy based approaches.
Secure data aggregation in WSN is a very mature research ﬁeld
and the literature reports many solutions addressing at the same
time aggregation issues and security aspects such as conﬁdential-
ity, integrity, authentication, and availability (an exhaustive and
very comprehensive view of this topic can be found in Ozdemir
and Xiao (2009)). The approaches proposed so far can be classi-
ﬁed into two big families depending on whether the hop-by-hop
or end-to-end cryptography is used. Hop-by-hop encryption is
usually based on symmetric key schemes, which demand less com-
puting resources than asymmetric key ones. These algorithms,
such as Bagaa et al. (2007), Mahimkar and Rappaport (2004),
Przydatek et al. (2003), Cam et al. (2006), Du et al. (2003), Wu et al.
(2007), Sanli et al. (2004), Yang et al. (2006), and Ozdemir (2007),
require each aggregator to decrypt every message it receives to
allow in-network processing, thus causing a conﬁdentiality breach.
Furthermore, applying several consecutive encryption/decryption
operations can negatively impair latencies. Finally, hop-by-hop
Fig. 16. Total number of transmitted messages in a network with N nodes.
aggregation requires each node to share secret keys with all its
neighbors. In order to face these problems, aggregation algorithms
able to work on ciphered data, using either asymmetric or sym-
metric keys (Ozdemir, 2005; Westhoff et al., 2006; Rodhea and
Rohner, 2008; Zhang et al., 2008; Domingo-Ferrer, 2002; Sun et al.,
2007) have been proposed. However, the main limitation of such
approaches is that they allow very simple aggregation functions
to be used, such as sum and average (Ozdemir and Xiao, 2009).
Despite this very broad variety of proposals, no single solution has
been conceived yet to address conﬁdentiality, integrity, adaptive
aggregation and privacy issues at the same time, as DyDAP does.
7. Conclusion
This paper has presented the problemof secure end-to-end data
aggregation and privacy management in WSN. An innovative inte-
grated solution for dynamicdata aggregationwithprivacy function,
DyDAP, has been presented. The elements involved in the manage-
ment of privacy-related information are represented using UML
modeling, whereas an algorithm based on discrete-time control
theory is exploited for aggregating data. The effectiveness of the
proposed frameworkhasbeenveriﬁedusingcomputer simulations.
The results show that DyDAP is able to reduce the network load in
case of congestion and to improveWSNestimation accuracy,while,
at the same time, it guarantees anonymity management and data
integrity.
At the moment we are planning to extend our work along sev-
eral directions in order to analyze in depth theDyDAP behavior and
to improve its efﬁciency. In particular, we are experimenting the
application of DyDAP to multimedia sensor networks whose nodes
may exchange audio and video signals, showing how the proposed
solution canbe tailored tomanyapplicationdomains. Furthermore,
we are evaluating lightweight optimization strategies forminimiz-
ing the variance of the aggregated data, also considering a broader
set of topological conﬁgurations, such as those containing multi-
ple sinks. In order to improve the level of security towards attacks
we are studying game-theoretic approaches to model malicious
nodes. As regard data trust we shall combine DyDAP with other
cross layer information, i.e., information dealing with node reputa-
tion information. Moreover, in this direction we also envisage the
possibility of using emerging nano-technologies or hybrid archi-
tectures to overcome the power limits. Finally, we will evaluate
DyDAP as building block of several secure Internet of Things (IoT)
scenarios.
Author's personal copy
S. Sicari et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 85 (2012) 152–166 165
Acknowledgements
This work was partially funded by Regione Puglia, Italy, A.Q.P.
ResearchProject “Modelli Innovativi per SistemiMeccatronici,”Del.
CIPE 20/04, DM01; “L’OrMaICT - ICT supporting logistic services:
a model of organized market” Strategic Project PS 025; and by
Regione Lombardia, Italy, Research Project MoSE for Agrofood.
We would kindly acknowledge Vito Lamonaca, Claudio
Ciciriello, and Luca de Letteriis for their valuable support on the
simulation platform.
References
Akan, O.B., Akyildiz, I.F., 2005. Event-to-sink reliable transport in wireless sensor
networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 13 (5), 1003–1016.
Akyildiz, I.F., Melodia, T., Chowdhury, K., 2007. A survey on wireless multimedia
sensor networks. Elsevier Computer Networks Journal.
Akyildiz, I.F., Brunetti, F., Blazquez, C., 2008.Nanonetworking: anewcommunication
paradigm. Elsevier Computer Networks Journal.
Al-Muhtadi, J., Campbell, R., Kapadia, A.,Mickunas,M.D., Yi, S., 2002. Routing through
the mist: privacy preserving communication in ubiquitous computing environ-
ments. In: Proceedings of IEEE Int. Conf. on Distributed Computing systems
(ICDS), Vienna, Austria.
Astrom, K.J., Wittenmark, B., 1995. Computer Controlled Systems: Theory and
Design, 3rd edition. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
Bagaa, M., Lasla, N., Ouadjaout, A., Challal, Y., 2007. Sedan: secure and efﬁcient pro-
tocol for data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In: Proceedings of IEEE
LCN, Dublin, Ireland.
Baronti, P., Pillai, P., Chook,V.W.C., Chessa, S., Gotta, A.,Hu, Y.F., 2007.Wireless sensor
networks: a survey on the state of the art and the 802.15.4 and ZigBee standards.
Computer Communications 30 (7), 1655–1695.
Boggia, G., Camarda, P., Grieco, L.A., Mascolo, S., 2007. Feedback-based control for
providing real-time services with the 802.11e MAC. IEEE/ACM Transactions on
Networking 15 (2), 323–333.
Cam, H., Ozdemir, S., Nair, P., Muthuavinashiappan, D., Sanli, H., 2006. Energy-
efﬁcientandsecurepatternbaseddataaggregation forwireless sensornetworks.
Computer Communications Elsevier 29 (4), 446–455.
Castalia simulator—ofﬁcial website, 2011. http://castalia.npc.nicta.com.au.
Castelluccia, C.,Mykletun, E., Tsudik,G., 2005. Efﬁcient aggregationof encrypteddata
in wireless sensor networks. In: Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems:
Networking and Services.
Chan, H., Perrig, A., 2003. Security and privacy in sensor networks. IEEE Computer
Magazine, 103–105.
Coen-Porisini, A., Colombo, P., Sicari, S., Trombetta, A., 2007. A conceptual model for
privacy policies. In: Proc. of SEA 2007, Cambridge (MS), USA.
Coen-Porisini, A., Colombo, P., Sicari, S., 2010a. Dealing with anonymity in wireless
sensor networks. In: Proc. of 25th annual ACM symposium on Applied Comput-
ing (ACM SAC), Sierre, Switzerland.
Coen-Porisini, A., Colombo, P., Sicari, S.,2010b. privacy aware systems: from mod-
els to patterns. In: Software Engineering for Secure Systems: Industrial and
Research Perspectives. IGI Global.
Dardari, D., Conti, A., Buratti, C., Verdone, R., 2007. Mathematical evaluation of
environmental monitoring estimation error through energy-efﬁcient wireless
sensor networks. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 6 (7), 790–802.
DeBano, A., Leonard, F., Rice, M., Conrad, C., 2011. Soil heating in chaparral ﬁres:
effects on soil properties, plant nutrients, erosion, and runoff, Paciﬁc Southwest
Forest and Range Experiment Station P.O. Box 245, Res. Paper PSW-145.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament. Ofﬁcial Journal of the European
Communities of 23 November 1995 No L. 281, p. 31.
Domingo-Ferrer, J., 2002. A provably secure additive and multiplicative privacy
homomorphism. In: Information Security Conference.
Du,W., Deng, J., Han, Y., Varshney, P., 2003. Awitness-based approach for data fusion
assurance in wireless sensor networks. In: IEEE Global Telecommunications
Conference (GLOBECOM ‘03).
Duri, M.G.S., Liu, P.M.X., Perez, R., Singh, M., Tang, J., 2000. Framework for security
and privacy in automotive telematics. In: Proceedings of 2nd ACM International
Workshop on Mobile Commerce.
Fasolo, E., Rossi, M., Widmer, J., Zorzi, M., 2007. In-network aggregation techniques
for wireless sensor networks: a survey. IEEE Wireless Communications.
Grieco, L.A., Boggia, G., Sicari, S., Colombo, P., 2009. Secure wireless multimedia sen-
sor networks: a survey. In: Proc. of The Third Int. Conf. on Mobile Ubiquitous
Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies, UBICOMM, Sliema, Malta.
Gruteser, M., Grunwald, D., 2003. A methodological assessment of location privacy
risks in wireless hotspot networks. In: Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Security in Pervasive Computing.
Gruteser, M., Schelle, G., Jain, A., Han, R., Grunwald, D., 2003. Privacy-aware location
sensor networks. In: Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Workshop on Hot Topics in
Operating Systems (HotOS IX).
Hu, L., Evans, D., 2003. Secure aggregation for wireless networks. In: Workshop on
Security and Assurance in Ad Hoc Networks.
Jacobson, V., 1988. Congestion avoidance and control. SIGCOMM Computer Com-
munications Review 18 (4), 314–329.
Kushalnagar, N.,Montenegro, G., Schumacher, C. IPv6 over Low-PowerWireless Per-
sonal AreaNetworks (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, ProblemStatement,
and Goals, IETF Request For Comment (RFC 4919), August 2007.
Langheinrich,M., 2002. A privacy awareness system for ubiquitous computing envi-
ronments. In: Proceedings of the 4th Int. Conf. on Ubiquitous Computing.
Mahimkar, A., Rappaport, T., 2004. Securedav: a secure data aggregation and
veriﬁcationprotocol forwireless sensor networks. In: 47th IEEEGlobal Telecom-
munications Conference (Globecom).
Mastrocristino, T., Tesoriere, G., Grieco, L.A., Boggia, G., Palattella, M.R., Camarda, P.,
2010. Control based on data-aggregation for wireless sensor networks. In: Proc.
of IEEE Int. Symp. on Industrial Electronics, ISIE2010, Bari, Italy.
Molnar, D., Wagner, D., 2004. Privacy and security in library rﬁd: issues practices
and architectures. In: Proceedings of ACM CCS.
Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., Culler, D. Transmission of IPv6 Packets
over IEEE 802.15.4Networks, IETF Request For Comment (RFC 4944), September
2007.
Ni, Q., Trombetta, A., Bertino, E., Lobo, J., 2007. Privacy-aware role based access con-
trol. In: Proceedings of the 12th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and
Technologies, ACM, New York, NY, USA.
OMG Uniﬁed Modeling Language: Infrastructure, Ver. 2.1.2, formal/2007-11-02
(November 2007).
OMG Uniﬁed Modeling Language: Superstructure, Ver. 2.1.2, formal/2007-11-02
(November 2007).
Ozdemir, S., Xiao, Y., 2009. Secure data aggregation in wireless sensor networks: a
comprehensive overview. Computer Networks 53.
Ozdemir, S., 2005. Functional reputation based reliable data aggregation and trans-
mission for wireless sensor networks. Elsevier Computer Communications 31
(17), 3941–3953.
Ozdemir, S., 2007. Secure and reliable data aggregation forwireless sensor networks.
LNCS 4836, 102–109.
Papoulis, A., 1991. Probability, Random Variables and Stochastic Processes, 3rd edi-
tion. Mc Graw Hill.
Perrig, A., Szewczyk, R., Tygar, J.D., Wen, V., Culler, D.E., 2002. Spins: security proto-
cols for sensor networks. Wireless Networking 8 (5), 521–534.
Priyantha, N.B., Chakraborty, A., Balakrishnan, H., 2000. The cricket location support
system. In: Proceedings of ACM Sixth Annual ACM International Conference on
Mobile Computing and Networking (MOBICOM).
Przydatek, B., Song, D., Perrig, A., 2003. Sia: secure information aggregation in sensor
networks. In: SenSys’03.
Rodhea, I., Rohner, C., 2008. n-lda: n-layers data aggregation in sensor networks. In:
28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops.
Samarati, P., Sweeney, L., 1998. Protecting privacy when disclosing information:
k-anonymity and its enforcement through generalization and suppression,
Technical Report SRI-CSL-98-04, Computer Science Laboratory, SRI Interna-
tional.
Sanli, H., Ozdemir, S., Cam, H., 2004. Srda: secure reference-based data aggregation
protocol for wireless sensor networks. In: IEEE VTC Fall Conference.
She, J.P.M., Yeow, J.T.W., 2006. Nanotechnology-enabled wireless sensor networks:
from a device perspective. IEEE Sensors Journal 6 (5).
Sicari, S., Riggio, R., 2009. Secure aggregation in hybrid mesh and wireless sensor
networks. In: Proc. of IEEE ICUMT’09, St. Petersburg, Russia.
Smailagic, A., Siewiorek, D.P., Anhalt, J., Kogan, Y.W.D., 2001. Location sensing and
privacy in a context aware computing environment. In: Proceedings of Pervasive
Computing.
Snekkenes, E., 2001. Concepts for personal location privacy policies. In: Proceedings
of 3rd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce.
Sun, B., Chand, N., Wu, K., Xiao, Y., 2007. Change-point monitoring for secure
in-network aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In: IEEE Global Telecom-
munications Conference (GLOBECOM 2007).
Walke, B.H.,Mangold, S., Berlemann, L., 2006. IEEE 802Wireless Systems. JohnWiley
& Sons, Ltd., NJ, USA.
Watteyne, T., Molinaro, A., Richichi, M.G., Dohler, M., 2010. From MANET to IETF
ROLL standardization: a paradigm shift in WSN routing protocols. IEEE Commu-
nications Surveys and Tutorials.
Westhoff, D., Girao, J., Acharya, M., 2006. Concealed data aggregation for
reverse multicast trafﬁc in sensor networks: encryption key distribution
and routing adaptation. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 5, 1417–
1431.
Wu, K., Dreef, D., Sun, B., Xiao, Y., 2007. Secure data aggregation without persistent
cryptographic operations in wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Networks 5 (1),
100–111.
Yang, Y.,Wang, X., Zhu, S., Cao, G., 2006. Sdap: a secure hop-by-hop data aggregation
protocol for sensor networks. In: ACM MOBIHOC’06.
Younis, O., Krunz,M., Ramasubramanian, S., 2006.Node clustering inwireless sensor
networks: recent developments and deployment challenges. Network, IEEE 20
(3), 20–25.
Zhang, W., Liu, Y., Das, S., De, P., 2008. Secure data aggregation in wireless sen-
sor networks: a watermark based authentication supportive approach. Elsevier
Pervasive Mobile Computing 4, 658–680.
Zhanga, H., Arorab, A., Choic, Y., Goudac, M., 2007. Reliable bursty converge-
cast in wireless sensor networks. Elsevier Computer Communications 30 (13),
2560–2576.
Sabrina Sicari is Assistant Professor at Università degli Studi dell’Insubria (Italy).
She received her master degree in Electronical Engineering in 2002 and her Ph.D.
in Computer and Telecommunications Engineering in 2006 from Università degli
Author's personal copy
166 S. Sicari et al. / The Journal of Systems and Software 85 (2012) 152–166
Studi di Catania (Italy). FromSeptember 2004 toMarch 2006 she has been a research
scholar at Politecnico di Milano Since May 2006 she works at Università degli Studi
dell’Insubria in the software engineering group.
Her research interests are on wireless sensor networks (WSN), risk assessment
methodology and privacy models.
She is amemberof theEditorial BoardofComputerNetwork (Elsevier) and IC@ST
magazine. She is the general co-chair of S-Cube’09, a steering Committee member
of S-Cube’10 and S-Cube’11, guest editor for the ACM Monet Special Issue, named
“Sensor, system and Software”, TPC member and reviewer for many journals and
conferences.
Luigi Alfredo Grieco received the Dr. Eng. degree (with honors) in electronic engi-
neering from “Politecnico di Bari,” Bari, Italy, in October 1999 and the Ph.D. degree
in information engineering from “Università di Lecce,” Lecce, Italy, on December
2003. Since January 2005, he has been an Assistant Professor in telecommunications
with the “Dipartimento di Elettrotecnica ed Elettronica, Politecnico di Bari”. From
March to June 2009, he has been a Visiting Researcher with INRIA (Planete Project,
Sophia Antipolis, France), working on the topics of “Internet Measurements” and
“Scheduling in WiMax Networks.” He has authored 100 scientiﬁc papers published
in international journals and conference proceedings. His main research interests
are congestion control in packet-switching networks, quality of service and ser-
vice discovery in wireless networks, wireless sensor networks, Internet multimedia
applications, Internet measurements, and real-time video processing using cellular
nonlinear networks.
Gennaro Boggia received the Dr. Eng. and Ph.D. degrees (with honors) in electron-
ics engineering from the “Politecnico di Bari” Bari, Italy, in July 1997 and March
2001, respectively. From May 1999 to Dec. 1999, he was a Visiting Researcher with
the “TILab, TelecomItaliaLab” (formerly the Centro Studi e Laboratori Telecomuni-
cazioni), Italy, where he was involved in the study of the future releases of cellular
mobile networks.
Since September 2002, he has been with the “Dipartimento di Elettrotecnica ed
Elettronica, Politecnicodi Bari,”wherehe is currently anAssistant Professor. In 2007,
he was a Visiting Researcher with FTW, Vienna, Austria, where he was involved
in activities on passive and active trafﬁc monitoring in cellular networks. He has
authoredor co-authoredmore than80papers in international journalsor conference
proceedings. His research interests are in the ﬁelds of wireless networking, multi-
media systems, cellular communication, quality of service in wireless networks,
queuing networking, and network performance evaluation.
Alberto Coen Porisini received his Dr. Eng. degree and Ph.D in Computer Engineer-
ing from Politecnico di Milano (Italy) in 1987 and 1992, respectively. He is Professor
of Software Engineering at Università degli Studi dell’Insubria (Italy) since 2001 and
Dean of the School of Science since 2006. Prior to that he was Associated Professor
at Università degli Studi di Lecce (1998–2001), Assistant Professor at Politecnico di
Milano (1993–2001) and Visiting Researcher with the Computer Security Group at
University of California, Santa Barbara (1992–1993).
His main research interests are in the ﬁeld of speciﬁcation and design of real-
time systems, privacy models and wireless sensor networks.
